States although [REDACTED, "as of [date]"] Beijing did not intend to try to affect the election, [REDACTED text on] online influence and collecting derogatory information about US [public figures] (p.1, p.3).
p.1China section:China
NICA — Foreign Threats to 2020 US Federal Elections (19 August 2020)
National Intelligence Council AssessmentAug 19, 20208 pagesNICA Foreign Threats To 2020 US Election_19AUG2020 DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf
Declassified by President Trump 3 July 2026
Key Insights
AI-generated from the sourced claims — verify against the documents.
China has expanded cyber collection of data on U.S. political candidates, campaigns, donors, and voter data through opportunistic intrusions against private-sector entities.
If Beijing judged the downward trajectory in US-China relations threatened China's rise, it might attempt to more directly thwart the President's reelection, including by leaking information or through an online influence network.
The scope and scale of China's current influence activity at the state and local level far outpaces Russia's and Turkey's.
16 sourced claims
Key takeaway: foreign states will continue to use covert and overt influence measures to sway U.S. voters, shift U.S. policies, increase discord, and undermine confidence in democratic processes; primary concern is Russia, China, and Iran (p.1).
p.1Scope note: downgraded version of a paper originally published 19 August 2020; updates NICM 2020-3 [OCR: NICM 2020-03:3]; addresses China's broader influence efforts; does not assess impact on the U.S. or discuss efforts the IC cannot attribute (p.1).
p.1Assesses Russia, China, Iran, and many nonstate actors have the capability to compromise election infrastructure, though it would be difficult to manipulate voting processes at scale without detection (p.1).
p.1Assesses China prefers President Trump — whom Beijing sees as unpredictable and tough on China — does not win reelection; in the past few months China stepped up public rhetoric criticizing his Administration (p.1, p.3).
p.1China section:China
Russia section: assesses Russia is using measures to denigrate former VP Biden; names the Lakhta Internet Research (LIR) troll farm, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the GRU; references Derkach and Kilimnik as proxy actors; as of June 2020 Russia reconnoitered multiple state and local government [systems] (purpose unknown); in April, unidentified actors used ransomware against a Virginia county administrator and voter registration [system] (p.2-3, p.5, p.7).
p.2China section:Russia
Defines "election influence" (activities targeting candidates, parties, voters/preferences, or political processes) and "election interference" (a subset involving technical aspects — voter registration, casting/counting ballots, reporting results) (p.2).
p.2Notes a newspaper owned by the Chinese [government/party] claimed economic measures Beijing could take against supporters of COVID-19 compensation legislation/lawsuits may impact U.S. state and congressional races — the first time the IC observed Beijing issue a public warning suggesting willingness to impose economic costs that could affect U.S. elections (p.4).
p.4China section:China
China uses mostly enticements and occasionally coercion to extract pro-China positions; employs disinformation and critical statements attacking USG handling of COVID-19, the Houston Consulate closure, Hong Kong, South China Sea legal status, and 5G; a pro-China network of online accounts posted video content critical of President Trump before being deactivated by social media platforms (p.4).
p.4China section:China
Assesses Beijing probably calculates a concerted effort to influence the presidential election would risk backfiring and offer uncertain benefit, but recognizes critical statements might affect the race (p.4).
p.4China section:China
Assesses if Beijing judged the downward trajectory in US-China relations threatened China's rise, it might attempt to more directly thwart the President's reelection, including by leaking information [REDACTED] or through an online influence network (p.4).
p.4China section:China
Threats to Election Infrastructure: hostile actors could exploit internet-connected infrastructure (voter registration databases, pollbooks, election officials' websites); could manipulate vote-counting systems on a localized basis but a wide-scale campaign would be difficult and likely detected by post-election audits and paper trails (p.5).
p.5China section:
States Beijing has expanded its cyber collection of data related to the 2020 US elections through opportunistic intrusions against US private-sector entities to collect information on U.S. political candidates, campaigns, donors, and voter data (p.5).
p.5China section:China
Iran section: conducting an influence campaign to undermine the President; Supreme Leader Khamenei probably authorized it; in January, Iranian-contract cyber actors tried to compromise a server associated with a US business involved in election infrastructure, and the FBI worked with the company to remediate; in June, Google announced Iranian-linked actors unsuccessfully attempted to spearphish campaign staffers' email accounts (p.5-6).
p.5Other foreign actors: senior Turkish officials including President Erdogan sought to covertly influence US politicians (covert funding of US municipal election campaigns, unregistered lobbying); German Chancellor Merkel; Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (mid-2019) (p.6-7).
p.6China section:
Includes a matrix graphic, "Efforts by Selected Countries To Manipulate US Political Landscape," describing efforts over at least the past four years; text notes the scope/scale of China's current influence activity at the state and local level "far outpaces Russia's and Turkey's" (p.8).
p.8Page evidence
NICA — Foreign Threats to 2020 US Federal Elections (19 August 2020) · p.6
Page OCR text
DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026 a NIC HH NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL presidential candidates and that even impersonated a candidate in 2018. Tehran also uses these accounts to attempt to influence US audiences by promoting messages aligned with Lanian policies. RN 1 21120's links to some of these efforts. es [an could attempt to manipulate or attack election infrastructure—as it has in elections in the Middle East and South Asia—but we do not have ° Over the past any information indicating that it intends to do so in the two years, social media companies have United States. It could also seek to collect and publicly removed thousands of Iranian-origin inauthentic release damaging information. accounts—some with links to the Iranian Government—that have shared information © pe | January, franian-contract cyber critical of both the current President and other actors tried to compromise a server associated with a US business involved in election infrastructure, Dt MH «BI worked with the company to remediate the problem. © gag fn June, Google announced that Iranian- linked cyber actors had unsuccessfully attempted to spearphish email accounts associated with campaign staffers working for the US President. Iran pursues such efforts in part to acquire derogatory information it could release publicly, as well as to inform its broader aims of weakening the US and damaging its standing abroad. (U) Other Foreign Actors mmm A range of other foreign actors have expressed. preferences for the outcome of the election. We have reporting on a few that have either considered or taken steps to attempt to covertly influence US voters, presidential candidates, or US politics surrounding the election. For example: ° Se $cu0r Turkish officials, including President Erdogan, believe that segments of the US Government have an entrenched, anti-Turkey viewpoint, and as a result have sought to covertly influence US politicians’ and political candidates’ thinking on [6] DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026
Page 6 of 8