Iran

The IC judges that Russia, China, Iran, and many nonstate actors have the capability to compromise election infrastructure (interfere with voting, steal data, or call into question validity), but it would be difficult to manipulate voting processes at scale and without detection (p.1).

Primary concern is ongoing/potential influence activity by Russia, China, and Iran (p.1).

Iran / Threats to Election Infrastructure: hostile actors could exploit Internet-connected election infrastructure (voter-registration databases, pollbooks, official websites) due to ease of access and lack of security, to disrupt or sow doubt (p.5).

Iranian accounts have impersonated presidential candidates (including one in 2018); social media companies removed thousands of Iranian-origin inauthentic accounts over two years (p.5-6).

Iran is conducting an influence campaign to undermine the President and US democratic institutions and divide the country; Tehran sees the administration as promoting regime change in Iran; efforts focus on online covert influence and disinformation; Supreme Leader Khamenei probably authorized the campaign (p.5).

In January, Iranian-contract cyber actors tried to compromise a server tied to a US election-infrastructure business; the FBI worked with the company to remediate. In June, Google announced Iranian-linked actors unsuccessfully attempted to spearphish email accounts of campaign staffers working for the US President (p.6-7).

Iran could attempt to manipulate/attack election infrastructure — as it has in Middle East and South Asia elections — but the IC has no information it intends to do so in the US (p.6-7).

A graphic ("Efforts by Selected Countries To Manipulate US Political Landscape") maps observed vs. preparatory vs. not-observed efforts across categories including public opinion, national/state leaders, leaking intelligence-acquired information, election processes, legal processes, economic leverage, and punitive measures; text notes China's state/local influence far outpaces Russia's and Turkey's and Russia has leaked intelligence-acquired information more often than Iran (p.8). Specific per-country marker values in the graphic are not legible in the OCR [OCR unclear] (p.8).

Assesses Russia, China, Iran, and many nonstate actors have the capability to compromise election infrastructure, though it would be difficult to manipulate voting processes at scale without detection (p.1).

Key takeaway: foreign states will continue to use covert and overt influence measures to sway U.S. voters, shift U.S. policies, increase discord, and undermine confidence in democratic processes; primary concern is Russia, China, and Iran (p.1).

Iran section: conducting an influence campaign to undermine the President; Supreme Leader Khamenei probably authorized it; in January, Iranian-contract cyber actors tried to compromise a server associated with a US business involved in election infrastructure, and the FBI worked with the company to remediate; in June, Google announced Iranian-linked actors unsuccessfully attempted to spearphish campaign staffers' email accounts (p.5-6).

Russia almost certainly reconnoitered all US state election networks during the 2016 cycle, accessed election-related infrastructure in at least two states, and exfiltrated voter data from at least one state; Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are all capable of similar operations in 2020 (p.1).

Assesses at least Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have the capability to access and potentially manipulate data in US election-related computer systems, but the IC does not know whether they have specific plans to interfere (p.1).

Closing notes the Iran section edits are "much improved"; signed by Nikki L. Floris, Counterintelligence Division, FBIHQ; classification field [REDACTED] (p.2).

CISA and the FBI reported members of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps attempted to exploit websites to obtain voter registration data; they confirmed the actor successfully obtained voter registration data in at least one state and could not determine success in the other 11 states targeted (September 2020) (p.4). [OCR: "Iranian Republic Guard Corp"]

Graphic covers Russia, China, Iran, and a fourth [REDACTED] country; comments requested by COB Tuesday 1 September; contains redacted material for Russia and China with serial numbers included for access verification (p.22).