NICA — Foreign Threats to 2020 US Federal Elections (19 August 2020)

States although [REDACTED, "as of [date]"] Beijing did not intend to try to affect the election, [REDACTED text on] online influence and collecting derogatory information about US [public figures] (p.1, p.3).

Key takeaway: foreign states will continue to use covert and overt influence measures to sway U.S. voters, shift U.S. policies, increase discord, and undermine confidence in democratic processes; primary concern is Russia, China, and Iran (p.1).

Scope note: downgraded version of a paper originally published 19 August 2020; updates NICM 2020-3 [OCR: NICM 2020-03:3]; addresses China's broader influence efforts; does not assess impact on the U.S. or discuss efforts the IC cannot attribute (p.1).

Assesses Russia, China, Iran, and many nonstate actors have the capability to compromise election infrastructure, though it would be difficult to manipulate voting processes at scale without detection (p.1).

Assesses China prefers President Trump — whom Beijing sees as unpredictable and tough on China — does not win reelection; in the past few months China stepped up public rhetoric criticizing his Administration (p.1, p.3).

Russia section: assesses Russia is using measures to denigrate former VP Biden; names the Lakhta Internet Research (LIR) troll farm, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the GRU; references Derkach and Kilimnik as proxy actors; as of June 2020 Russia reconnoitered multiple state and local government [systems] (purpose unknown); in April, unidentified actors used ransomware against a Virginia county administrator and voter registration [system] (p.2-3, p.5, p.7).

Defines "election influence" (activities targeting candidates, parties, voters/preferences, or political processes) and "election interference" (a subset involving technical aspects — voter registration, casting/counting ballots, reporting results) (p.2).

Notes a newspaper owned by the Chinese [government/party] claimed economic measures Beijing could take against supporters of COVID-19 compensation legislation/lawsuits may impact U.S. state and congressional races — the first time the IC observed Beijing issue a public warning suggesting willingness to impose economic costs that could affect U.S. elections (p.4).

China uses mostly enticements and occasionally coercion to extract pro-China positions; employs disinformation and critical statements attacking USG handling of COVID-19, the Houston Consulate closure, Hong Kong, South China Sea legal status, and 5G; a pro-China network of online accounts posted video content critical of President Trump before being deactivated by social media platforms (p.4).

Assesses Beijing probably calculates a concerted effort to influence the presidential election would risk backfiring and offer uncertain benefit, but recognizes critical statements might affect the race (p.4).

Assesses if Beijing judged the downward trajectory in US-China relations threatened China's rise, it might attempt to more directly thwart the President's reelection, including by leaking information [REDACTED] or through an online influence network (p.4).

Threats to Election Infrastructure: hostile actors could exploit internet-connected infrastructure (voter registration databases, pollbooks, election officials' websites); could manipulate vote-counting systems on a localized basis but a wide-scale campaign would be difficult and likely detected by post-election audits and paper trails (p.5).

States Beijing has expanded its cyber collection of data related to the 2020 US elections through opportunistic intrusions against US private-sector entities to collect information on U.S. political candidates, campaigns, donors, and voter data (p.5).

Iran section: conducting an influence campaign to undermine the President; Supreme Leader Khamenei probably authorized it; in January, Iranian-contract cyber actors tried to compromise a server associated with a US business involved in election infrastructure, and the FBI worked with the company to remediate; in June, Google announced Iranian-linked actors unsuccessfully attempted to spearphish campaign staffers' email accounts (p.5-6).

Other foreign actors: senior Turkish officials including President Erdogan sought to covertly influence US politicians (covert funding of US municipal election campaigns, unregistered lobbying); German Chancellor Merkel; Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (mid-2019) (p.6-7).

Includes a matrix graphic, "Efforts by Selected Countries To Manipulate US Political Landscape," describing efforts over at least the past four years; text notes the scope/scale of China's current influence activity at the state and local level "far outpaces Russia's and Turkey's" (p.8).