States although [REDACTED, "as of [date]"] Beijing did not intend to try to affect the election, [REDACTED text on] online influence and collecting derogatory information about US [public figures] (p.1, p.3).
p.1China section:China
NICA — Foreign Threats to 2020 US Federal Elections (19 August 2020)
National Intelligence Council AssessmentAug 19, 20208 pagesNICA Foreign Threats To 2020 US Election_19AUG2020 DECLASS_REDACTED.pdf
Declassified by President Trump 3 July 2026
Key Insights
AI-generated from the sourced claims — verify against the documents.
China has expanded cyber collection of data on U.S. political candidates, campaigns, donors, and voter data through opportunistic intrusions against private-sector entities.
If Beijing judged the downward trajectory in US-China relations threatened China's rise, it might attempt to more directly thwart the President's reelection, including by leaking information or through an online influence network.
The scope and scale of China's current influence activity at the state and local level far outpaces Russia's and Turkey's.
16 sourced claims
Key takeaway: foreign states will continue to use covert and overt influence measures to sway U.S. voters, shift U.S. policies, increase discord, and undermine confidence in democratic processes; primary concern is Russia, China, and Iran (p.1).
p.1Scope note: downgraded version of a paper originally published 19 August 2020; updates NICM 2020-3 [OCR: NICM 2020-03:3]; addresses China's broader influence efforts; does not assess impact on the U.S. or discuss efforts the IC cannot attribute (p.1).
p.1Assesses Russia, China, Iran, and many nonstate actors have the capability to compromise election infrastructure, though it would be difficult to manipulate voting processes at scale without detection (p.1).
p.1Assesses China prefers President Trump — whom Beijing sees as unpredictable and tough on China — does not win reelection; in the past few months China stepped up public rhetoric criticizing his Administration (p.1, p.3).
p.1China section:China
Russia section: assesses Russia is using measures to denigrate former VP Biden; names the Lakhta Internet Research (LIR) troll farm, Russia's Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR), and the GRU; references Derkach and Kilimnik as proxy actors; as of June 2020 Russia reconnoitered multiple state and local government [systems] (purpose unknown); in April, unidentified actors used ransomware against a Virginia county administrator and voter registration [system] (p.2-3, p.5, p.7).
p.2China section:Russia
Defines "election influence" (activities targeting candidates, parties, voters/preferences, or political processes) and "election interference" (a subset involving technical aspects — voter registration, casting/counting ballots, reporting results) (p.2).
p.2Notes a newspaper owned by the Chinese [government/party] claimed economic measures Beijing could take against supporters of COVID-19 compensation legislation/lawsuits may impact U.S. state and congressional races — the first time the IC observed Beijing issue a public warning suggesting willingness to impose economic costs that could affect U.S. elections (p.4).
p.4China section:China
China uses mostly enticements and occasionally coercion to extract pro-China positions; employs disinformation and critical statements attacking USG handling of COVID-19, the Houston Consulate closure, Hong Kong, South China Sea legal status, and 5G; a pro-China network of online accounts posted video content critical of President Trump before being deactivated by social media platforms (p.4).
p.4China section:China
Assesses Beijing probably calculates a concerted effort to influence the presidential election would risk backfiring and offer uncertain benefit, but recognizes critical statements might affect the race (p.4).
p.4China section:China
Assesses if Beijing judged the downward trajectory in US-China relations threatened China's rise, it might attempt to more directly thwart the President's reelection, including by leaking information [REDACTED] or through an online influence network (p.4).
p.4China section:China
Threats to Election Infrastructure: hostile actors could exploit internet-connected infrastructure (voter registration databases, pollbooks, election officials' websites); could manipulate vote-counting systems on a localized basis but a wide-scale campaign would be difficult and likely detected by post-election audits and paper trails (p.5).
p.5China section:
States Beijing has expanded its cyber collection of data related to the 2020 US elections through opportunistic intrusions against US private-sector entities to collect information on U.S. political candidates, campaigns, donors, and voter data (p.5).
p.5China section:China
Iran section: conducting an influence campaign to undermine the President; Supreme Leader Khamenei probably authorized it; in January, Iranian-contract cyber actors tried to compromise a server associated with a US business involved in election infrastructure, and the FBI worked with the company to remediate; in June, Google announced Iranian-linked actors unsuccessfully attempted to spearphish campaign staffers' email accounts (p.5-6).
p.5Other foreign actors: senior Turkish officials including President Erdogan sought to covertly influence US politicians (covert funding of US municipal election campaigns, unregistered lobbying); German Chancellor Merkel; Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad Bin Salman (mid-2019) (p.6-7).
p.6China section:
Includes a matrix graphic, "Efforts by Selected Countries To Manipulate US Political Landscape," describing efforts over at least the past four years; text notes the scope/scale of China's current influence activity at the state and local level "far outpaces Russia's and Turkey's" (p.8).
p.8Page evidence
NICA — Foreign Threats to 2020 US Federal Elections (19 August 2020) · p.5
Page OCR text
DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026 NIC HMI RS Beijing bas expanded its cyber collection of data related to NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE COUNCIL the 2020 US elections by carrying out opportunistic intrusions against US private- sector entities in efforts to collect information on US political candidates, campaigns, donors, and voter data. (U) Tran Ga Threats to Election Infrastructure mmm «WV€ assess that hostile actors could exploit Internet-connected election infrastructure-—such as voter registration databases, pollbooks, and state or local election officials’ websites—because of its ease of access and comparative lack of security. These systems are designed for accessibility, commonly through web portals, making them vulnerable to a range of malicious cyber activities. A committed adversary could potentially use access to these systems to disrupt or sow doubts about our democratic election processes. Wu «(We assess that hostile actors could also manipulate systems that count or tabulate votes— such as voting machines—on a localized basis, but it probably would be difficult to coordinate a campaign to alter voting results on a wide scale. Post-election audits and paper trails also most likely would uncover such efforts in the nearly all US states. Similarly, foreign actors would have difficulty coordinating a large scale campaign to manipulate mail-in voting, and robust postal tracking probably would detect any large-scale effort. mu Cyber operations targeting the reporting of electronic tabulation results could delay reporting but probably would not affect the integrity of certified results. Denial of service attacks would also delay public access to results. Tran is conducting an influence campaign to undermine the current President and US democratic institutions, and to divide the country in advance of the 2020 elections. Tehran sees the current adminiswation as promoting regime change in Iran, WE 2 View that increases the Iranian leadership’s interest in trying to prevent the President’s reelection. Iran’s efforts probably will focus on online covert influence, such as spreading disinformation on social media and recirculating anti-US content. ay me Supreme Leader Khamenei probably has authorized the influence campaign. These efforts focus largely on creating or amplifying social media content that criticizes the President and recirculating existing news reports, memes, and hashtags focused on US civil unrest, domestic protests for racial justice, mail-in voting, and the administration’s handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. EE DECLASSIFIED BY PRESIDENT TRUMP on 3 July 2026
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