FBI

Underlying email from Nikki L. Floris (FBI, Counterintelligence Division, sent to [REDACTED], cc Tonya Ugoretz) offers thoughts on the updated ICA draft, all centered on the minority view (p.1).

FBI states that while fine with including a minority-view textbox, the analysis in it "must comport to the same analytic standards as the rest of the ICA" — described as "an absolute red line for the FBI" (p.1).

FBI does not support including the minority view in the Key Judgments (KJs), arguing that without proper context and source descriptions it is given parity with the ICA assessments (p.1-2).

On the first paragraph: the NIO states China's leaders "intended" some efforts to indirectly affect US candidates; FBI says the IC has repeatedly stated there is no evidence of such intention (though awareness of the potential effect existed), and calls stating it bluntly "extremely misleading" (p.2).

On the second paragraph: the NIO gives more weight to several clandestine and liaison reports without source descriptions; FBI objects that this equates clandestine reporting of dubious credibility with signals intelligence of identified senior Chinese diplomatic/intelligence figures and reliable clandestine reporting from Beijing (p.2).

On the last "tic": the NIO assesses China "may" also have encouraged protests; FBI says there is no evidence in the reporting and the citations do not support it, calling it "highly misleading" (p.2).

The dissent's final paragraph argues collection gaps exist on entities that would execute influence operations; FBI says citing the absence of evidence is "an absolute red line" and inconsistent with earlier dissent argumentation (p.2).

Package organized in tabs including electronic media reviewed, people identified for interview, personnel link chart, IIR dissemination and recall flow charts, IPPG sections, FBI Albany IIR #1 and #2 flow charts, pertinent electronic communications, log of direct communication between DAD Floris and DAD Ugoretz, the recalled IIR, and IIR recall statistics from 2019-June 2025 (p.1).

The IIR at issue is FBI Albany IIR 4 212 7305 20 (the fraudulent-drivers-licenses/mail-in-votes report), disseminated ~7:23 a.m. on 25 September 2020 (p.11).

IIR source details: originating office Albany, squad AL-3 CI; country PRC and USA; source motivated by "a sense of indebtedness towards the United States after being granted asylum," and disapproval of PRC governance; source obtained the information from an identified sub-source in China claiming contact with unidentified PRC government officials; FBI opened the source 14 August 2020 and acquired the information 24 August 2020 (date of information masked for source protection) (p.15-17).

FITF issued a lead to FBI Chicago (28 Sep 2020) to coordinate with CBP on whether any fraudulent driver's licenses seized by CBP were used to register to vote (p.28).

FBI Chicago/CBP response (5 Oct 2020): CBP does not maintain a list of names and addresses on counterfeit licenses; the majority of such documents "are procured by teens between the ages of 18 and 20 who then modify their DOB... to circumvent alcohol laws" (p.30, p.34).

Floris-OGA IM (undated within package): Floris states "we're pushing out a note today to all FOs that all election related IRs must come through FITF/HQ" and "i'm basically running a shadow government across the FBI at this point"; the OGA participant notes "The Director has the original in his book this AM" (referring to the recalled IIR) (p.32).

PIN (Director, Election Crimes Branch / Deputy Chief, Public Integrity Section) acknowledged FBI/DE was investigating a potential voter-registration fraud scheme involving canvassers for the organization `[REDACTED]` in Michigan's 2020 election (p.1).

PIN stated the matter implicated the Department's election non-interference policy (JM § 9-85.300) and election-year sensitivities policy (JM § 9-85.500), because Michigan voter registration is unitary (federal and state) and interviews close to the November 7, 2023 election could create a public perception of the DOJ/FBI acting to affect that election (p.1).

FBI proposed interviewing approximately 100 individuals who served as canvassers in 2020 to determine whether they submitted falsified applications, possibly to meet employment quotas (p.1).

Addressed FM DIRECTOR FBI TO ALL FBI FIELD OFFICES, with a wide INFO distribution to defense commands and IC agencies (24AF/543 ISR GP Lackland AFB, USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, USPACOM, USSTRATCOM, USTRANSCOM, INSCOM, NGIC, CIA, DHS, DOJ, State, Treasury, DIA, NSA, DNI, ONI, SECDEF, White House Situation Room, LEGAT/AMEMBASSY Beijing, etc.) (p.1-2).

Warning: information report not finally evaluated; receiving agencies requested not to take action without prior coordination with the FBI; presumption of innocence noted (p.3).

Dissemination page (partly redacted) lists agencies: CIA, Coast Guard, DHS, FBI, Air Force, Army, DIA, Defense, Navy; State/Local: None (p.5).

Russian government cyber actors attempted to identify and exploit SQL database vulnerabilities in webservers/databases; FBI reported lacking insight into extent of success, but in at least two separate instances Russian actors accessed voter registration files from a US county website (June 2016) (p.3).

DHS and FBI confirmed Russian actors conducted election system reconnaissance and probed voter registration databases in all 50 states; they could not confirm how many probes resulted in successful breaches. In January 2017, White House officials reported the federal assessment was that networks in at least seven states were compromised (2016) (p.3).

CISA and the FBI reported members of the Iranian Republican Guard Corps attempted to exploit websites to obtain voter registration data; they confirmed the actor successfully obtained voter registration data in at least one state and could not determine success in the other 11 states targeted (September 2020) (p.4). [OCR: "Iranian Republic Guard Corp"]

10/27/2020 — MSP briefed the FBI Detroit Election Team (p.1).

9/13/2023 — a lead sent to the FBI Laboratory for examination of voter-registration applications; 9/27/2023 — funding requested from FBIHQ for 20 agents to conduct canvasser interviews, approved by the PCU the same date (p.2).

States there was no evidence that anyone submitted false voter registrations for the purpose of establishing the ability to vote; FBI Detroit (OCR shows "GBI Detroit") found no evidence that anyone [instructed others to] submit false voter registrations (p.1).

FBI Detroit, Grand Rapids Resident Agency closed the captioned matter, stating no further investigation was warranted because logical investigation and/or leads had been exhausted and the investigation to date did not identify a criminal violation or a priority threat to national security (p.1).

Google and the FBI both briefed campaign officials; Google publicly stated the spear-phishing attempts were unsuccessful (p.1).

Document details: Produced By CIA; Product Type World Intelligence Review; Publication Date 01 Jul 2020; produced jointly under the Chief of Analysis, the FBI, and the NSA (p.2).

Google and the FBI both briefed campaign officials shortly after discovering the activity; Google publicly stated the spear-phishing attempts were unsuccessful (p.1).

Produced jointly under the auspices of the Chief of Analysis, [REDACTED], the FBI, and the NSA; Product Type: World Intelligence Review (p.2).

The Director writes he has "burned enough political capital arguing with CIA and FBI about this," and is unsure "why so many in the community want to close down the possibility that China might have done or be doing *something*" (p.3).

Notes that at the last COI meeting "everyone around the table at NSA had thoughts similar" but many were reticent to express them because FBI and CIA "seemed so adamant about their stances" (p.3).

FBI (Unit Chief, Foreign Influence Task Force — China) concurs with CIA and INR edits; states the "preference line," when included as a top line in election-related products, "could imply the opposite of what community consensus seems to be — namely that activities are focused on policy preferences and that election related activity is not worth the risk" (p.3).

INR (INR/EAP, Department of State) states three concerns: (1) evidence for China not interfering is stronger than acknowledged, and the IC should make a judgment call rather than leave it to the reader; (2) China's influence efforts to shift public opinion on policy issues are not the same as election interference; (3) there is relative consensus within the China-watching community (INR, CIA, NSA, FBI) about how to describe China's activities, and NIC disagreement should be a standalone dissent rather than rewriting community consensus (p.7-8).

On 10/27/2020, MSP briefed the FBI Detroit Election Team (DET); Detroit notified the U.S. Attorneys for EDMI and WDMI (p.3–4).

On 10/27/2020, an MCPD Captain provided the FBI a copy of police report 2020-19124 (p.4).

The FBI completed database checks on 20 randomly selected applications with apparently different handwriting from those the Muskegon Clerk flagged; compared name, last-four SSN, MI DL number, DOB, gender, address, and phone (p.1).

Sender identified only as FBI Detroit — Grand Rapids (unit "GR-1/I-21"); recipient `[REDACTED]` (p.1).

PIN wrote that, based on previous calls with the FBI and the USAO for the Western District of Michigan and other information, the respective offices had evaluated the matter and were not seeking further investigative or prosecutive action at that time, and PIN agreed with that conclusion (p.1).

The file title names the organization "GBI Strategies"; the email body references it only in redacted form, with the agent stating he is "one of the agents assigned to the [REDACTED] investigation out of FBI Detroit" (p.1).

11/3/2021 (external CRM email) — a party would send an email memorializing "PIN's agreement with the decisions of the USAO and FBI to not seek prosecution here," copying USAO-W.D. Mich. (p.2).

FBI Detroit was informed that MSP, the Michigan Attorney General, and the Muskegon police (MCPD) were investigating fraudulent voter registrations submitted to the MCCO; the matter was referred to law enforcement by the MCCO (p.2).

2/11/2021 (FBI summary) — On October 5, 2020, the Muskegon Clerk's Office began receiving applications flagged as potentially fraudulent (non-existent addresses, invalid phone numbers, signature-matching issues, same/similar handwriting); applications came from the same company; on October 8, 2020, a subject came in person to drop off more; in total about 8,000–10,000 applications were mailed (p.3).

Iran section: conducting an influence campaign to undermine the President; Supreme Leader Khamenei probably authorized it; in January, Iranian-contract cyber actors tried to compromise a server associated with a US business involved in election infrastructure, and the FBI worked with the company to remediate; in June, Google announced Iranian-linked actors unsuccessfully attempted to spearphish campaign staffers' email accounts (p.5-6).

In January, Iranian-contract cyber actors tried to compromise a server tied to a US election-infrastructure business; the FBI worked with the company to remediate. In June, Google announced Iranian-linked actors unsuccessfully attempted to spearphish email accounts of campaign staffers working for the US President (p.6-7).