China

Prepared by the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Cyber and the Director, Election Threat Analysis (D/ETA); offers an alternative perspective to the IC assessment that China has not attempted to influence the 2020 presidential election outcome; provided to the IC for comment but not IC-coordinated (p.1).

The NIO and D/ETA assess Beijing has taken at least some low-level, exploratory steps to undermine the President's reelection chances by denigrating him and shaping voter perceptions — differing from the IC judgment that Beijing considered but did not deploy influence efforts (p.1).

They assess Beijing's efforts probably included overt messaging, nascent online covert-influence capabilities, diplomatic measures, and economic leverage, but probably not its most aggressive options [REDACTED], because Beijing wants to minimize blowback and stabilize the relationship post-election (p.1).

IC mainline judgment: the IC (including the NIO for East Asia and other NIC officers) assesses Beijing has not deployed influence efforts intended to change the election outcome, believing Chinese leaders desire stability in US-China relations and have tools to achieve goals regardless of winner, and prefer restraint (p.1).

[REDACTED, ~2019] reporting assessed "hostile forces" could fabricate claims that Beijing was interfering to demonize China, and that Beijing should avoid giving Washington a pretext to "scapegoat" China (p.2).

The IC has seen no indication Beijing is engaged in an effort to influence the election outcome, nor activity likely resulting from such an effort; while Beijing has developed [REDACTED] other options usable to influence the election, the IC has not seen them deployed (p.2).

Beijing began taking unspecified steps around 2020 to damage the President's reelection in response to US pressure on China's [REDACTED — semiconductor/technology] sector; senior leaders expected China's semiconductor industry would continue to be damaged if the President were reelected, and unspecified officials expected sanctions relief if US resolve weakened or a candidate from a named party were elected (p.3).

[REDACTED] recommended China collect derogatory "black materials" on the US President and "sensationalize" them at the appropriate time (p.3).

The Chinese Government reportedly tasked its US missions to use Chinese groups/organizations to incite protests to damage the President's standing; [REDACTED] Chinese entities assessed racial conflict would be a large factor and government-affiliated Chinese technology-company employees were assisting [REDACTED] to incite violence and protests (p.3-4).

Alternative view indicators: the NIO and D/ETA assess private-sector and open-source reporting suggests the Chinese Government has engaged in at least some level of influence targeting US voters and candidates, knowing it could affect the outcome (p.3).

[REDACTED] Chinese actors were experimenting with creation of deepfakes intended to denigrate President Trump, in response to directives to improve Beijing's ability to manipulate public opinion (p.4).

A pro-China influence network on US social media posted messages (some English-language) denigrating the President; the NIO/D/ETA assess elements of the government were at minimum aware of and condoned the campaign and may have directed it, basing this on content alignment with Beijing's messaging, similarity to prior Chinese campaigns, duration/frequency, rapid video creation in response to world events, and ability to operate outside China's Great Firewall (p.4).

A social media platform took down a separate cluster of unattributed pro-China accounts that created four groups — one favoring the President, two favoring his opponents, and one primarily denigrating the President (p.4).

The IC assesses that since 2018 China has researched methods and developed new tools for online covert influence to sway American audiences (p.4).

A newspaper owned by the Chinese Communist Party claimed economic measures could affect US state and congressional races — the first observed public warning Beijing might impose economic costs affecting US elections; in 2019 [REDACTED] advised gaining leverage over US policy by directing resources to political swing states (p.5).

Footnote reference: NICM 2019-113, in which the IC warned that because China would probably use the same tactics to influence the election as it uses to influence US policy, the IC might not detect such a pivot (p.5).

China from March launched overt and covert influence efforts on COVID-19 messaging, spreading disinformation about pandemic origins and publicizing English-language cartoons denigrating the President's crisis handling (p.5).

Counter-consideration: no reporting suggests China engaged in more aggressive measures (funneling large donations, compromising voting infrastructure, or interfering with mail-in ballots); some elements of state power (e.g., trade) are used ambiguously — China continued buying agricultural products under the Phase One trade deal, which Beijing probably assessed would help the President's reelection and stabilize relations (p.6).

A comparison table ("Comparing Judgments on Chinese Election Influence") contrasts the MINORITY/alternative ASSESSMENT vs. IC judgments across items such as broad influence efforts, probable preference for Trump's defeat, considering/preparing an election-influence effort, risk-vs-gain concerns, preparing for either outcome, avoiding a whole-of-government effort and interference with US election systems, and undertaking a few covert efforts to undermine Trump's reelection; specific marker values are not clearly legible in the OCR [OCR unclear] (p.7).

States although [REDACTED, "as of [date]"] Beijing did not intend to try to affect the election, [REDACTED text on] online influence and collecting derogatory information about US [public figures] (p.1, p.3).

Assesses China prefers President Trump — whom Beijing sees as unpredictable and tough on China — does not win reelection; in the past few months China stepped up public rhetoric criticizing his Administration (p.1, p.3).

Assesses Russia, China, Iran, and many nonstate actors have the capability to compromise election infrastructure, though it would be difficult to manipulate voting processes at scale without detection (p.1).

Key takeaway: foreign states will continue to use covert and overt influence measures to sway U.S. voters, shift U.S. policies, increase discord, and undermine confidence in democratic processes; primary concern is Russia, China, and Iran (p.1).

Scope note: downgraded version of a paper originally published 19 August 2020; updates NICM 2020-3 [OCR: NICM 2020-03:3]; addresses China's broader influence efforts; does not assess impact on the U.S. or discuss efforts the IC cannot attribute (p.1).

China uses mostly enticements and occasionally coercion to extract pro-China positions; employs disinformation and critical statements attacking USG handling of COVID-19, the Houston Consulate closure, Hong Kong, South China Sea legal status, and 5G; a pro-China network of online accounts posted video content critical of President Trump before being deactivated by social media platforms (p.4).

Assesses Beijing probably calculates a concerted effort to influence the presidential election would risk backfiring and offer uncertain benefit, but recognizes critical statements might affect the race (p.4).

Notes a newspaper owned by the Chinese [government/party] claimed economic measures Beijing could take against supporters of COVID-19 compensation legislation/lawsuits may impact U.S. state and congressional races — the first time the IC observed Beijing issue a public warning suggesting willingness to impose economic costs that could affect U.S. elections (p.4).

Assesses if Beijing judged the downward trajectory in US-China relations threatened China's rise, it might attempt to more directly thwart the President's reelection, including by leaking information [REDACTED] or through an online influence network (p.4).

States Beijing has expanded its cyber collection of data related to the 2020 US elections through opportunistic intrusions against US private-sector entities to collect information on U.S. political candidates, campaigns, donors, and voter data (p.5).

Includes a matrix graphic, "Efforts by Selected Countries To Manipulate US Political Landscape," describing efforts over at least the past four years; text notes the scope/scale of China's current influence activity at the state and local level "far outpaces Russia's and Turkey's" (p.8).

The IC judges that Russia, China, Iran, and many nonstate actors have the capability to compromise election infrastructure (interfere with voting, steal data, or call into question validity), but it would be difficult to manipulate voting processes at scale and without detection (p.1).

Primary concern is ongoing/potential influence activity by Russia, China, and Iran (p.1).

China prefers President Trump be defeated and has stepped up public rhetoric criticizing his Administration; the assessment states [REDACTED] Beijing did not intend to try to affect the election (p.1, p.3).

If Beijing assessed the downward US-China trajectory threatened China's rise, it might attempt to more directly thwart the President's reelection, including by leaking information [REDACTED] or through an online influence network (p.4).

A newspaper owned by the Chinese [Communist Party] claimed economic measures against supporters of COVID-19 compensation legislation/lawsuits may impact US state and congressional races — the first observed public warning that Beijing might impose economic costs affecting US elections (p.4).

The IC assesses Beijing probably calculates a concerted effort to influence the presidential election would risk backfiring for uncertain benefit, but recognizes critical statements might affect the race (p.4).

China uses mostly enticements, occasionally coercion, plus disinformation attacking US handling of COVID-19 and issues like the Houston Consulate closure, Hong Kong, South China Sea, and 5G; a pro-China network posted video content critical of President Trump before deactivation (p.4).

Beijing expanded cyber collection related to the 2020 elections via opportunistic intrusions against US private-sector entities to collect on candidates, campaigns, donors, and voter data (p.5).

A graphic ("Efforts by Selected Countries To Manipulate US Political Landscape") maps observed vs. preparatory vs. not-observed efforts across categories including public opinion, national/state leaders, leaking intelligence-acquired information, election processes, legal processes, economic leverage, and punitive measures; text notes China's state/local influence far outpaces Russia's and Turkey's and Russia has leaked intelligence-acquired information more often than Iran (p.8). Specific per-country marker values in the graphic are not legible in the OCR [OCR unclear] (p.8).

Since [OCR unclear] 2018, Chinese cyber actors known in the private sector as APT31 [OCR renders "AP 3"; identified as APT31 later on p.1] targeted personal email accounts of senior U.S. leadership, including officials in the Executive Office of the President, high-ranking officials in multiple Executive Branch organizations, Congress, and the federal judiciary (p.1).

As the 2020 election approached, the IC detected Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors targeting the former Vice President's presidential campaign — described as the first instance this cycle of direct targeting of a U.S. presidential campaign (p.1).

Assesses China does not currently intend to covertly interfere to sway the election outcome, although this activity could enable such operations if Beijing decided to do so (p.1).

During the past year, Chinese cyber actors collected U.S. election-related information from U.S. voter databases, a polling data company, political and nonprofit organizations, fundraisers, and advisory organizations for political campaigns (p.1).

APT31's tracking-link method suggests mapping the target network for follow-on approaches, possibly including tasking campaign staffers' email accounts in the Chinese military's signals intelligence system for collection (p.1-2).

Title/lead: "China: Cyber Activities Probably Prelude to Election Espionage"; China is probing the presidential campaign for opportunities to tailor collection and gather insight on U.S.-China policy positions (p.1).

States U.S. policy on China is a longstanding high collection priority for Beijing, and Chinese cyber actors have conducted such activity in every U.S. presidential election campaign since at least 2008 (p.1).

Addressed FM DIRECTOR FBI TO ALL FBI FIELD OFFICES, with a wide INFO distribution to defense commands and IC agencies (24AF/543 ISR GP Lackland AFB, USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, USPACOM, USSTRATCOM, USTRANSCOM, INSCOM, NGIC, CIA, DHS, DOJ, State, Treasury, DIA, NSA, DNI, ONI, SECDEF, White House Situation Room, LEGAT/AMEMBASSY Beijing, etc.) (p.1-2).

Country: United States; China (p.3).

Subject: "Chinese Government Production and Export of Fraudulent US Drivers Licenses to Chinese Sympathizers in the United States, in Order to Create Tens of Thousands of Fraudulent Mail-in Votes for US Presidential Candidate Joe Biden, in late August 2020" (p.3).

Source described as "a collaborative source with indirect access, none of whose reporting has been corroborated for less than one year"; the source obtained the information from an identified sub-source who claimed to have obtained it from unidentified PRC government officials (p.3).

Text: in late August 2020 the Chinese government had produced a large amount of fraudulent U.S. drivers licenses secretly exported to the U.S. (NFI), which would allow tens of thousands of Chinese students and immigrants sympathetic to the CCP to vote for U.S. Presidential Candidate Joe Biden despite being ineligible (p.3).

China had collected private US user data from millions of TikTok accounts (name, ID, and address), which would allow the Chinese government to use real US persons' information to create the fraudulent licenses with true ID and true address of US citizens, making them difficult to [detect]; China planned to use the licenses for tens of thousands of mail-in votes (p.4).

Analyst comment: a person's address information was not a valid field when creating a TikTok account, and it was unspecified how China would attain US data from the application; source available for re-contact (p.4).

Describes China extending paid speaking invitations (with first-class travel/accommodation) to influential U.S. individuals — effective with think tank officials, academics, and former U.S. government employees — to get U.S. corporations/individuals "hooked on China" and thereby pressure them to talk with the U.S. President (p.2).

States it contains portions of sensitive reporting disseminated between 2018 and 2020 related to the PRC, and is not a comprehensive synopsis (p.2).

Mid-2018: the Chinese Communist Party's policy was to leverage all domestic and foreign elements opposed to the U.S. President to reduce his votes and make him resign or prevent his re-election (p.2).

Mid-2018: China was working to influence the results of the U.S. mid-term elections and later the 2020 U.S. Presidential elections; China was analyzing the 2016 [OCR: "2015"] U.S. Presidential elections and identifying U.S. states that voted for the President, then targeting sectors within those states with tariffs on exports to China to induce their representatives to lobby the President (p.2).

Mid-2018: assessed the PRC's ultimate goal regarding U.S. elections was for the President not to be re-elected; China found the uncertainty of the U.S. administration unsettling (p.2).

Mid-2019: China assessed directing additional resources toward political swing states, viewing them as crucial for the 2020 election, and recommended applying pressure to financial supporters of the President's re-election campaign (p.2-3).

Mid-2019: China's strategy focused on undermining domestic confidence in the President, using Chinese contracts with big U.S. companies to influence business leaders against him, and seeking to identify and pay U.S. journalists who reported negatively on the President to write more negative articles; the Chinese Government wanted the President to lose the next election (p.3).

Named personnel/offices: FITF (China CD), Criminal Investigative Division A/DAD Brian Cohen, Albany Field Office SAC Thomas Relford, Cyber Division DAD Tonya Ugoretz, CD DAD Nikki Floris, DI SC Kellie Hardiman, FITF SC Bradley Benavides, and various SIAs/CROs/ASCs (identities partly redacted) (p.4, p.11-12).

Timeline of 25 Sep 2020: FITF-China received the IIR at 10:19 a.m.; by afternoon CD DAD Floris and Cyber DAD Ugoretz were engaged; Floris emailed CID asking whether they were tracking the IIR ("Given the topic, this is obviously going to get quite a bit of attention"); Ugoretz replied "Thanks. This is fun."; DI SC Hardiman noted "another election related IIR went out... that is creating a stir" and that Floris wanted DI to work with FITF to push out guidance (p.11).

IIR source details: originating office Albany, squad AL-3 CI; country PRC and USA; source motivated by "a sense of indebtedness towards the United States after being granted asylum," and disapproval of PRC governance; source obtained the information from an identified sub-source in China claiming contact with unidentified PRC government officials; FBI opened the source 14 August 2020 and acquired the information 24 August 2020 (date of information masked for source protection) (p.15-17).

Internal debate (29 Sep - 2 Oct 2020): FBIHQ figures wrote the reporting should be backed up "with a minimum of the following information and treat it like it will be going in front of the President," citing "the conflict of this information to that of the wider USIC, the fact that it contradicts Director Wray's testimony to Congress, and the importance to the current administration"; and expressed skepticism "based on the portions regarding COVID that veer into conspiracy theories," including asking whether the subsource was "the same one who said that the Chinese Government had underground bases in Republican states to disperse Coronavirus" (p.19-22, p.26).

The alternative context statement the author proposed: "The acquisition of the source's information passed through a sub-source who claimed contact with unidentified PRC government officials, leaving the veracity of information questionable but is being reported due to the nature of the threat being discussed" — later reworded before release to "The source obtained the information from an identified sub-source who claimed contact with unidentified PRC government officials" (p.26).

Resolution: FITF-China did not want the IIR reissued; on 8 October 2020 the field agreed with FITF-China's assessment not to reissue and notified SAC Thomas Relford; a Sentinel record notes the IA deleted the draft IIR due to "Internal Coordination" on 15 October 2020 (p.27, p.30-31).

Albany Field Office 2020 recall total: the only recall is 802I-AL-49205-INTELPRODS 207 — the SUBSTANTIVE RECALL of the Chinese fraudulent-drivers-licenses/mail-in-votes IIR (p.35).

The NIO — Cyber expresses concern "about politics seeping into this," arguing there is no reason they can't say they have [X] confidence that China has a preference, and is "troubled by CIA's comments at the recent COI" (p.1).

FBI (Unit Chief, Foreign Influence Task Force — China) concurs with CIA and INR edits; states the "preference line," when included as a top line in election-related products, "could imply the opposite of what community consensus seems to be — namely that activities are focused on policy preferences and that election related activity is not worth the risk" (p.3).

Repeated proposed sentence: "Unidentified pro-China influence actors [REDACTED] have been spreading English-language videos on US social media platforms that criticize the President's policies, promote socially divisive themes, and denigrate him" (p.4, p.9, p.13, p.16).

INR (INR/EAP, Department of State) states three concerns: (1) evidence for China not interfering is stronger than acknowledged, and the IC should make a judgment call rather than leave it to the reader; (2) China's influence efforts to shift public opinion on policy issues are not the same as election interference; (3) there is relative consensus within the China-watching community (INR, CIA, NSA, FBI) about how to describe China's activities, and NIC disagreement should be a standalone dissent rather than rewriting community consensus (p.7-8).

Multiple rounds of proposed language negotiate whether to say "China prefers that the President does not win reelection" versus "China is not at this time trying to influence the outcome"; agreed elements describe Beijing using "extensive lobbying, economic measures, information derived from computer network exploitation, and increasingly strident rhetoric" to press US officials and candidates, and "whole-of-government influence efforts ahead of November 2020" that "could be used to influence the 2020 election if Beijing directed Chinese officials to do so" (p.11-16).

Graphic covers Russia, China, Iran, and a fourth [REDACTED] country; comments requested by COB Tuesday 1 September; contains redacted material for Russia and China with serial numbers included for access verification (p.22).

Since [~2018], Chinese cyber actors known in the private sector as APT31 [OCR shows "AP 3"] have targeted personal e-mail accounts of senior US leadership, including officials in the Executive Office of the President and high-ranking officials across Executive Branch organizations, Congress, and the federal judiciary (p.1).

As the 2020 election approached, the IC detected Chinese state-sponsored actors targeting the former Vice President's presidential campaign, the first instance that cycle of directly targeting a US presidential campaign; China also conducted cyber espionage against other US election-related entities (p.1).

The IC assessed China did not then intend to covertly interfere to sway the election outcome, though the activity could enable such operations if Beijing decided to do so (p.1).

Over the prior year, Chinese cyber actors collected US election-related information from US voter databases, a polling-data company, political and nonprofit organizations, fundraisers, and advisory organizations for political campaigns (p.1).

APT31's use of tracking links suggests operators are mapping the target network for follow-on approaches, possibly tasking staffers' e-mail accounts in the Chinese military's signals-intelligence system; tracking links collect metadata (Internet activity, system information) usable to exploit accounts and identify other targets (p.1-2).

China is probing the presidential campaign for opportunities to tailor collection and gather insight on US-China policy positions; Chinese cyber actors have conducted such activity in every US presidential election campaign since at least 2008 (p.1).

Claim: recently declassified records revealed that China breached multiple state voter registration systems prior to the 2020 election (p.2).

Chinese state-sponsored cyber actors aggressively targeted U.S. critical infrastructure to steal sensitive data and PII (August 2021) (p.4).

Suspected Chinese cyber actors scanned both election-related and non-election state government websites; other suspected PRC cyber actors also collected publicly available U.S. voter information (2022) (p.4).

February 10, 2020: DOJ indicted four members of China's People's Liberation Army on economic espionage, wire fraud, and computer fraud counts; Attorney General William Barr described a "disturbing and unacceptable pattern of state-sponsored computer intrusions and thefts by China" targeting PII, trade secrets, and confidential information (p.9).

A University of Oxford report found Russia and China ranked first and third, respectively, as nations posing the highest threat level of cybercrime; PII available to these adversaries can also be purchased or accessed on the dark web (p.9).

Subject thread: "(U) Note to Election Threat 45 day ICA China Section Drafting Team" (p.1).

A drafter states there is pending [reporting] making it clear "China has been caught conducting election influence," and quotes that "NSA is 'deliberately massaged our one pending PDB to avoid any direct links to the election'" (p.2).

A Strategic Intelligence Analyst (NSA, China & North Korea Strategic Assessments) writes on 20 Nov: "We have deliberately massaged our one pending PDB to avoid any direct links to the election. The massive report we have been waiting on has been chopped up into 13 reports that likely will not get out until late next week," to be cross-posted/downgraded for incorporation into the 45-day piece (p.5).

Notes lower-level Chinese officials have recommended collecting and using "black materials" against perceived anti-China U.S. officials since at least January 2019, and this is the most detailed and authoritative recommendation seen (p.1).

States Beijing had told a [REDACTED] White House official it possessed derogatory information on him in an effort to compel a restrained approach to China [OCR unclear], describing a Chinese attempt to use blackmail against a U.S. administration official, with a threat to reveal the information through social media (p.1).

Title: "Beijing Escalating Efforts To Shape US Policies on China" (p.1).

On the first paragraph: the NIO states China's leaders "intended" some efforts to indirectly affect US candidates; FBI says the IC has repeatedly stated there is no evidence of such intention (though awareness of the potential effect existed), and calls stating it bluntly "extremely misleading" (p.2).

On the second paragraph: the NIO gives more weight to several clandestine and liaison reports without source descriptions; FBI objects that this equates clandestine reporting of dubious credibility with signals intelligence of identified senior Chinese diplomatic/intelligence figures and reliable clandestine reporting from Beijing (p.2).

On the last "tic": the NIO assesses China "may" also have encouraged protests; FBI says there is no evidence in the reporting and the citations do not support it, calling it "highly misleading" (p.2).

The Director writes he has "burned enough political capital arguing with CIA and FBI about this," and is unsure "why so many in the community want to close down the possibility that China might have done or be doing *something*" (p.3).

Their lead, in "short non-compartmented form": they assess "that Beijing has taken some low-level, exploratory steps to denigrate the President and shape voter perceptions ahead of the election" (p.7).

The Director, Election Threat Analysis (NIC/DNI Election Threat Executive) and the NIO — Cyber announce they are publishing an alternative analysis NIC memo because they have a different take on the China/election story than what has appeared in production (p.7).

The report cites [REDACTED] activity as "the Chinese military" even though in 2020 the IC said it did not know who the actor was; it re-characterizes the same unit as an election-influence unit attributed to the Chinese Government, which the author flags as a "weird coincidence" worth highlighting for oversight (p.1).

The author argues a referenced report cites some of the same intelligence and logic used in 2020 to conclude certain units were NOT engaged in election influence (only "issue-focused"), and now uses it to argue China IS influencing the [REDACTED] election (p.1).

Themes in this part: racial tensions (alleging White people hate Black people; inciting demonstrations as evidence of racial divides; increasing conflict between police and anti-racism activists; feeding a sense that U.S. law enforcement resents USG and people of color); USG tensions with the U.S. military; political party disagreements; Congress-Trump Administration conflicts; women's rights; U.S. South China Sea policies; alleged U.S. war aspirations; and international propaganda (p.1).

Repeats the same overarching framing (China's plans to sway public opinion against the Trump Administration and to exploit U.S. fissures, including a U.S.-China military conflict scenario) (p.1).

States China had developed capabilities to project these themes into social media (TikTok, Facebook, Twitter, YouTube and others) and mainstream media through overt and hidden influencers and media contributors; one option included gathering information on senior U.S. government officials to influence public opinion of them (p.1).

States ahead of the 2020 Presidential Elections, China had extensive plans to use [OCR unclear: potential] and cyber operations to sway public opinion against the Trump Administration and international opinion against the U.S. Government, designed to exploit U.S. societal fissures and vulnerabilities and, by extension, U.S. government decision-making; plans addressed several scenarios including U.S.-China military conflict (p.1).

Assesses at least Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea have the capability to access and potentially manipulate data in US election-related computer systems, but the IC does not know whether they have specific plans to interfere (p.1).

Russia almost certainly reconnoitered all US state election networks during the 2016 cycle, accessed election-related infrastructure in at least two states, and exfiltrated voter data from at least one state; Russia, China, Iran, and North Korea are all capable of similar operations in 2020 (p.1).

Author flags a report that "cites some of the same intel and logic used in 2020 to say that these same units were NOT engaged in election influence but were instead only issue-focused, to now argue that China IS influencing the [REDACTED] election" (p.1).

States the report cites [REDACTED] activity "as being 'the Chinese military'" even though in 2020 the IC said "we didn't know who it was," and now characterizes the same unit as an election-influence unit attributed to the Chinese Government — calling it "a weird coincidence" to highlight for oversight (p.1).

States the declassified intelligence reveals voter registration rolls "from at least 18 states (not all identified by name) have been compromised by the People's Republic of China (PRC)," and additional records reveal "more than 200 million voter records were also compromised by the PRC, without state-specific affiliations" (p.1).

Subject: PRC collection of U.S. Presidential election-related intelligence in 2020 using publicly available information from a U.S. government website (p.1).

Subject: PRC awareness in Mid-2020 of collection of U.S. Consumer, Military, and Voter Registration databases, with capabilities to conduct identity verification checks of U.S. persons (p.1).

Subject: PRC-affiliated individuals discuss targeting the 2024 U.S. elections; 2023 information (p.1).

Subject: PRC analysis on U.S. voter registration information from multiple states, to conduct "U.S. Identity Matching and Public Opinion Analysis"; dated 2019 (p.1).

Subject: PRC possesses a list (as of 2019) of likely leaked/compromised data that included U.S. entities; data sets apparently include those related to [REDACTED] and voter data/PII (p.1).

Describes PRC obtaining voter registration data containing personally identifiable information (PII) that could be used to analyze, discover, and [OCR unclear: identify] the identities of U.S. citizens, and to conduct U.S. General Election analysis (p.2).