Making the Case That China Has Taken Some Steps to Influence the Presidential Election (NICM — Alternative View)

Prepared by the National Intelligence Officer (NIO) for Cyber and the Director, Election Threat Analysis (D/ETA); offers an alternative perspective to the IC assessment that China has not attempted to influence the 2020 presidential election outcome; provided to the IC for comment but not IC-coordinated (p.1).

The NIO and D/ETA assess Beijing has taken at least some low-level, exploratory steps to undermine the President's reelection chances by denigrating him and shaping voter perceptions — differing from the IC judgment that Beijing considered but did not deploy influence efforts (p.1).

They assess Beijing's efforts probably included overt messaging, nascent online covert-influence capabilities, diplomatic measures, and economic leverage, but probably not its most aggressive options [REDACTED], because Beijing wants to minimize blowback and stabilize the relationship post-election (p.1).

The NIO and D/ETA hold low-to-medium confidence, noting much available reporting is consistent with either the mainline or alternative view (p.1).

IC mainline judgment: the IC (including the NIO for East Asia and other NIC officers) assesses Beijing has not deployed influence efforts intended to change the election outcome, believing Chinese leaders desire stability in US-China relations and have tools to achieve goals regardless of winner, and prefer restraint (p.1).

[REDACTED, ~2019] reporting assessed "hostile forces" could fabricate claims that Beijing was interfering to demonize China, and that Beijing should avoid giving Washington a pretext to "scapegoat" China (p.2).

The IC has seen no indication Beijing is engaged in an effort to influence the election outcome, nor activity likely resulting from such an effort; while Beijing has developed [REDACTED] other options usable to influence the election, the IC has not seen them deployed (p.2).

Alternative view indicators: the NIO and D/ETA assess private-sector and open-source reporting suggests the Chinese Government has engaged in at least some level of influence targeting US voters and candidates, knowing it could affect the outcome (p.3).

Beijing began taking unspecified steps around 2020 to damage the President's reelection in response to US pressure on China's [REDACTED — semiconductor/technology] sector; senior leaders expected China's semiconductor industry would continue to be damaged if the President were reelected, and unspecified officials expected sanctions relief if US resolve weakened or a candidate from a named party were elected (p.3).

[REDACTED] recommended China collect derogatory "black materials" on the US President and "sensationalize" them at the appropriate time (p.3).

The Chinese Government reportedly tasked its US missions to use Chinese groups/organizations to incite protests to damage the President's standing; [REDACTED] Chinese entities assessed racial conflict would be a large factor and government-affiliated Chinese technology-company employees were assisting [REDACTED] to incite violence and protests (p.3-4).

[REDACTED] Chinese actors were experimenting with creation of deepfakes intended to denigrate President Trump, in response to directives to improve Beijing's ability to manipulate public opinion (p.4).

A pro-China influence network on US social media posted messages (some English-language) denigrating the President; the NIO/D/ETA assess elements of the government were at minimum aware of and condoned the campaign and may have directed it, basing this on content alignment with Beijing's messaging, similarity to prior Chinese campaigns, duration/frequency, rapid video creation in response to world events, and ability to operate outside China's Great Firewall (p.4).

A social media platform took down a separate cluster of unattributed pro-China accounts that created four groups — one favoring the President, two favoring his opponents, and one primarily denigrating the President (p.4).

The IC assesses that since 2018 China has researched methods and developed new tools for online covert influence to sway American audiences (p.4).

A newspaper owned by the Chinese Communist Party claimed economic measures could affect US state and congressional races — the first observed public warning Beijing might impose economic costs affecting US elections; in 2019 [REDACTED] advised gaining leverage over US policy by directing resources to political swing states (p.5).

China from March launched overt and covert influence efforts on COVID-19 messaging, spreading disinformation about pandemic origins and publicizing English-language cartoons denigrating the President's crisis handling (p.5).

Footnote reference: NICM 2019-113, in which the IC warned that because China would probably use the same tactics to influence the election as it uses to influence US policy, the IC might not detect such a pivot (p.5).

Counter-consideration: no reporting suggests China engaged in more aggressive measures (funneling large donations, compromising voting infrastructure, or interfering with mail-in ballots); some elements of state power (e.g., trade) are used ambiguously — China continued buying agricultural products under the Phase One trade deal, which Beijing probably assessed would help the President's reelection and stabilize relations (p.6).

A comparison table ("Comparing Judgments on Chinese Election Influence") contrasts the MINORITY/alternative ASSESSMENT vs. IC judgments across items such as broad influence efforts, probable preference for Trump's defeat, considering/preparing an election-influence effort, risk-vs-gain concerns, preparing for either outcome, avoiding a whole-of-government effort and interference with US election systems, and undertaking a few covert efforts to undermine Trump's reelection; specific marker values are not clearly legible in the OCR [OCR unclear] (p.7).