CIA

Product is a CIA Note reflecting a CIA perspective, not coordinated within the Intelligence Community; produced under the Deputy Director of CIA for Analysis (p.2).

CIA's baseline assessments maintained that other factors better explained electoral outcomes; intelligence did not definitively confirm large-scale electronic fraud was successfully executed in specific Venezuelan elections (p.2).

CIA analysts assessed in 2006 that certain electronic voting-manipulation capabilities were technically possible and operationally feasible; [REDACTED] reporting stated Venezuelan machines had unspecified AI components, were designed to alter tallies, could detect when being audited, and could provide printed receipts without recording or transmitting votes (p.3).

CIA's baseline assessment held no large-scale electronic fraud occurred in 2012, based on pre-election polling (Chavez ahead ~10 points), a 24% increase in government spending before the election, the opposition's concession, and quantitative analysis showing no irregular voting patterns (p.3, p.5).

A 2013 CIA alternative analysis using the "Devil's Advocacy" methodology outlined a plausible scenario for large-scale electronic manipulation in Venezuela's 2012 election without detection, citing insider access, centralized CNE control, and gaps in opposition monitoring; it noted elections in Venezuela and other client countries "could be in doubt" if such manipulation occurred (p.3).

Page 6 contains only the "CIA NOTE" header with no substantive body text in the OCR [OCR unclear] (p.6).

The NIO — Cyber expresses concern "about politics seeping into this," arguing there is no reason they can't say they have [X] confidence that China has a preference, and is "troubled by CIA's comments at the recent COI" (p.1).

FBI (Unit Chief, Foreign Influence Task Force — China) concurs with CIA and INR edits; states the "preference line," when included as a top line in election-related products, "could imply the opposite of what community consensus seems to be — namely that activities are focused on policy preferences and that election related activity is not worth the risk" (p.3).

INR (INR/EAP, Department of State) states three concerns: (1) evidence for China not interfering is stronger than acknowledged, and the IC should make a judgment call rather than leave it to the reader; (2) China's influence efforts to shift public opinion on policy issues are not the same as election interference; (3) there is relative consensus within the China-watching community (INR, CIA, NSA, FBI) about how to describe China's activities, and NIC disagreement should be a standalone dissent rather than rewriting community consensus (p.7-8).

A CIA East Asia CI Division SME (Operations/IIA/Office of East Asia Pacific) writes it "speaks exactly to what has been on my mind but what was left out of the mainline IC assessment" and "looks very good!" (p.1-2).

Notes that at the last COI meeting "everyone around the table at NSA had thoughts similar" but many were reticent to express them because FBI and CIA "seemed so adamant about their stances" (p.3).

The Director writes he has "burned enough political capital arguing with CIA and FBI about this," and is unsure "why so many in the community want to close down the possibility that China might have done or be doing *something*" (p.3).

Addressed FM DIRECTOR FBI TO ALL FBI FIELD OFFICES, with a wide INFO distribution to defense commands and IC agencies (24AF/543 ISR GP Lackland AFB, USAFRICOM, USEUCOM, USPACOM, USSTRATCOM, USTRANSCOM, INSCOM, NGIC, CIA, DHS, DOJ, State, Treasury, DIA, NSA, DNI, ONI, SECDEF, White House Situation Room, LEGAT/AMEMBASSY Beijing, etc.) (p.1-2).

Dissemination page (partly redacted) lists agencies: CIA, Coast Guard, DHS, FBI, Air Force, Army, DIA, Defense, Navy; State/Local: None (p.5).

Document details: Produced By CIA; Product Type World Intelligence Review; Publication Date 01 Jul 2020; produced jointly under the Chief of Analysis, the FBI, and the NSA (p.2).